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Abstract 
This article provides a historically informed analysis of the contemporary incorporation 
of Islam and Muslims into an idea of common ± national ± membership in the United 
States and Britain.  It shows that there is a movement underway for synthesis between 
religious and national identities by Muslims themselves, and the ways in which this 
synthesis is occurring within rich and dynamic public spheres in these societies that have 
historically included and incorporated other religious groups.  We argue that while both 
countries are currently wrestling with the extent to which they can accommodate 
Muslims in ways that allow them to reconcile their faith and citizenship commitments, 
Establishment in the UK is no less successful at achieving this than secular republicanism 
in the US.   
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Résumé 
 
Cet article fournit une analyse historiquement informée dH O¶LQFRUSRUDWLRQ DFWXHOOH GH
O¶islam eW GHV PXVXOPDQV GDQV XQH LGpH G¶DSSDUWHQDQFH FRPPXQH ± nationale ± aux 
États-Unis et en Grande-Bretagne. NRXVPRQWURQVTX¶il existe un mouvement en cours 
généré par les musulmans eux-mêmes promouvant la synthèse entre les identités 
religieuses et nationales. Nous analysons les façons dont cette synthèse se produit dans 
les sphères publiques riches et dynamiques de ces sociétés qui ont historiquement inclus 
HW LQWpJUpV G¶autres groupes religieux. Enfin, nous soutenons que si les deux pays sont 
actuellement aux prises avec les limites dans lesquelles ils peuvent accueillir les 
PXVXOPDQVG¶une manière qui leur permettent de concilier leurs engagements en matière 
de foi HWGHFLWR\HQQHWpO¶pWDEOLVVHPHQW au Royaume-Uni ne connaît pas moins le succès 
atteint par le républicanisme laïque aux États-Unis. 
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Introduction 
In this article we explore how Muslims have been incorporated into conceptions of 
nationhood in Britain and the United States.  Scholarship on national identity has long 
recognised the close connection between religion and nationhood.  The variety of 
territorially anchored Protestant churches in post-reformation Europe illustrate this 
relationship, and even where organised religions have not achieved the µ(VWDEOLVKHG¶
status of Anglican or Lutheran Churches, or been subject to church-state separation, this 
has not resulted in God-state separation.  This observation is partly why Ernest Barker 
(1948: 14) insisted WKDW µQDWLRQV [have] long dreamt for their national unity in some 
common fund of religious idHDV¶ /LQGD &ROOH\¶V   FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI DQ
HDUOLHU%ULWDLQDVµDSURWHVWDQW,VUDHO¶DQG*HRII/HYH\¶VUHPLQGHUWKDWGHVSLWHLWV
wall of separation, the US has DOZD\VUHPDLQHGµ2QH1DWLRQ8QGHU*RG¶ affirm %DUNHU¶V
earlier observation.  Going further, in his Chosen People: Anglo-American Myths and 
Reality, Longley (2002: 10) insists WKDWµZHDUHQHYHUJRLQJWRUHDFKWKHERWWRPRILVVXHV
of national identity until we delve into the religious dimension >«@ 5HOLJLRQ LV D
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weightier ingredient in these national stories than most modern English people or 
$PHULFDQVZRXOGH[SHFW¶ (cf Wuthnow, 2006).   
This article contributes to these broader debates by focusing on how 
contemporary appeals to national identities react WR 0XVOLP µGLIIHUHQFHV¶. Specifically, 
we explore the extent to which the British experience is consistent with CasDQRYD¶V
(2009: 140±141) conclusion that: 
 
while in the United States the new immigrant religions have mainly 
contributed to the further expansion of immigrant religious pluralism, in 
the case of Europe, immigrant religions present a greater challenge to local 
patterns of limited religious pluralism, and even more importantly, to 
recent trends of drastic secularisation.   
 
Our aim is to contribute a historically contextualized analysis of the contemporary 
incorporation of Islam and Muslims into an idea of common ± national ± membership in 
these two countries. 
We begin by outlining the particular configuration of religion and nationhood in 
each context.  We then discuss the ways in which Islam and Muslims rest in ± and revise 
± each church-state settlement and prevailing conceptions of nationhood.  We conclude 
by examining the implications for theories of religious pluralisms.  Our observation is 
that there is a movement underway for a synthesis of religious and national identities by 
Muslims themselves, and that both the US and the UK boast rich public spheres and 
dynamic civil societies in which such synthesis is possible. While both countries are 
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currently wrestling with how to incorporate Muslims, in a manner that reconciles  faith 
and citizenship commitments, and so is not governed by racializing discourse and policy, 
we demonstrate that the Established UK is no less successful at this than the US.  
 
I-7KHµSHULOVRIPRGHOOLQJ¶ 
7KHWLWOHRIWKLVVHFWLRQLVWDNHQIURP9LHW%DGHU¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUWKHXVHRI
µIDLUO\GLVDJJUHJDWHG IUDPHV¶ LQ VWXG\LQJ WKHG\QDPLFVRI VWDWH-church relations, in that  
µ6WDWH-&KXUFK UHODWLRQV GR QRW ³GHWHUPLQH´ EXW ³VKDSH´ accommodation SROLFLHV¶ IRU
more recent religious minorities (Bader, 2007: 880, cf Fetzer and Soper, 2005).  We 
broadly agree ZLWK%DGHU¶VSRVLWLRQparticularly its encouragement of a context-sensitive 
approach. We do, however, still find it helpful to utilise the ideDRIFRQWUDVWLQJµPRGHOV¶± 
loosely defined ± to explore the incorporation of Muslims into existing social and 
political configurations of nationhood in the United States and Britain. 
It is often stated that the First Amendment of the US Constitution erects a 
µ-HIIHUVRQLDQ¶ZDOORI VHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQFKXUFKDQGVWDWH by mandating that Congress 
µVKDOO PDNH QR ODZ UHVSHFWLQJ DQ HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI UHOLJLRQ RU SURKLELWLQJ WKH IUHH
exercise thereof¶ Upon this relatively slender constitutional stipulation has come to rest a 
great deal of legal and political architecture that has been elaborated and tested in primary 
legislation, precedent, and practice. Two particular features of this history are relevant to 
our discussion. One is that within the historical practice of the idea of absolute separation 
there have actually been more complex outcomes that go beyond the privatisation of 
religion per se. Examples include the provision of government resources to religious 
organizations that deliver social services; some significant tax benefits enjoyed by 
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religious organizations; the prominence of religion in civil society, and the relationship 
between political parties and religious organisations 
The main focus of our discussion is on a second implication. Despite its 
theRUHWLFDO UHMHFWLRQRIµDOOSROLWLFDORUHFRQRPLFSULYLOHJHFRHUFLRQRUGLVDELOLW\EDVHG
RQ UHOLJLRXV DIILOLDWLRQ EHOLHIRUSUDFWLFH RU ODFN WKHUHRI¶ :HEHU WKH86
retains and reflects cultural vestiges of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, which may consign 
some minority religions to the periphery. This need not be a politically multiculturalist 
critique, given 7RFTXHYLOOH¶Vobservation that µLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV LW LVQRW
only mores that are controlled by religion, but its sway extendVRYHUUHDVRQ¶WRWKHH[WHQW
WKDWHYHQZLWKWKH)LUVW$PHQGPHQWµ&KULVWLDQLW\UHLJQVZLWKRXWREVWDFOHVE\XQLYHUVDO
FRQVHQW«DOWKRXJKWKHZRUOGRISROLWLFVVHHPVJLYHQRYHUWRDUJXPHQWDQGH[SHULPHQW¶ 
While it is true that the Protestant core has been a persistent obstacle to 
incorporating religious groups outside of it, through Tocquevillian processes of 
µDUJXPHQW DQG H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ¶ &DWKROLF DQG -HZLVK JURXSV KDYH KLVWRULFDOO\ VRXJKW
inclusion. Levey (2009: 9) lists a series of Jewish campaigns opposing Sunday closing 
laws, and supporting denominational schooling and holidays, which illustrate how µLQWKH
United States the new immigrant religions have mainly contributed to the further 
H[SDQVLRQ RI LPPLJUDQW UHOLJLRXV SOXUDOLVP¶ (Casanova, 2009: 140±141). In the time 
between TRFTXHYLOOH¶VREVHUYDWLRQDQG&DVDQRYD¶VFHOHEUDWLRQKRZHYHUWKHUHKDVEHHQ
much contestation in the re-IRUJLQJ RI DQ $PHULFDQ SXEOLF FXOWXUH LQ ZKLFK µEHLQJ D
Protestant, a Catholic or Jew are three acceptable ways of expressing American identity, 
WKDW EHLQJ UHOLJLRXV KDV EHFRPH LQ IDFW DQ HYLGHQFH RI DGKHUHQFH WR QDWLRQDO YDOXHV¶
(Wilson, 1966: 89±90). In his Protestant, Catholic, Jew (1955), Herberg frames the study 
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of religion in the United States through analysis of how national culture is saturated with 
religious movements and institutions.  This illustrates how nationhood and religion enter 
a dynamic relationship which produces new touchstones for identification. As Wilson 
(1966: 90) describes: 
 
In the recent historical development of America instead of religion being 
the source of such values as patriotism and the sense of national 
allegiance, as was the case in Europe, the acquisition of American 
QDWLRQDOLW\«KDV FRPH LQ WLPH WR QHHG D IXUWKHU DIILUPDWLRQ DQG WKDW
affirmation has been found in religious affirmation.  
 
 
Importantly, Wilson argues that for religion to be appropriated in the course, or renewal, 
of nation building, LWZRXOGKDYH WRPLQLPLVH UHOLJLRXVGLIIHUHQFHV VXFK WKDW µDOO IDLWKV
might serve the same end, and bHFRPHPRUHVLPLODUWRHDFKRWKHULQGRLQJVR¶Wilson, 
1966: 98). Bellah (1967) too understood the American story as one that had taken on the 
KDOOPDUNVRIDµFLYLOUHOLJLRQ¶RQHLQZKLFKDFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHµQDWLRQ¶LVLPEXHGZLWK
Christian language, rhetoric, and values.  This presents an exception to /HYH\¶V
YLHZWKDWµWKHUHOLJLRQPRGHODQGWKHQDWLRQ-state model have different logics and press in 
RSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQV¶ but is consistent with the broader µSDUDGR[¶RI$PHULFDQ UHOLJLRXV
and ethQLF SOXUDOLVP HJ µK\SKHQDWHG LGHQWLWLHV¶ LOOXVWUDWHG LQ WKH QRWLRQ RI -XGHR-
Christian American nationhood. The latter category was perhaps facilitated by three 
factors.  The first is that numerically American Jewry ± unlike American Catholics ± 
never presented a demographic challenge to Protestant predominance.  The second, is that 
µ-XGDLVP LQ $PHULFD GLG QRW HQFRXQWHU«UHOLJLRXVO\ EDVHG DQWL-6HPLWLVP¶ Casanova, 
  IRU UHDVRQV UHODWHG SDUWO\ WR WKH WKLUG LVVXH WKDW µLQ JHQHUDO $PHULFDQ
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Protestantism has tended to maintain a philio-+HEUDLFDWWLWXGH¶ Casanova, 2009: 157).1   
The centrality of the Judeo-Christian concept to the wider discourse of American 
nationhood is powerfully summarised by Connolly (1996: 57):  
 
«µWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOH¶µRXUFXOWXUH¶µRXUFKLOGUHQ¶µWKH-XGHR-Christian 
WUDGLWLRQ¶ µIDPLO\ YDOXHV¶ RU µFRPPRQ VHQVH¶«VXPPRQV WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ
of a country in which each regular individual is a microcosm of the nation 
and the nation is the macrocosm of the regular individual. The church, the 
nuclear family, the elementary school, the media and the university are 
institutions that must maintain these two primal units of culture as 
UHIOHFWLRQV RI HDFK RWKHU 7KH HQGOHVVO\ UHLWHUDWHG SKUDVH µWKH $PHULFDQ
SHRSOH¶FDSWXUHVWKLVFRPELQDWLon precisely....  
 
 
So how does this religiously infused, but potentially re-made, relationship between 
religion and nationhood contrast with models of nationhood in Europe, especially in the 
light of &DVDQRYD¶V (2009: 140±141) unfavourable contrast of the latter as quoted above?  
There are a number of ways in which Britain does not fit &DVDQRYD¶V portrayal. 
While it is quite true that the established Episcopal Church expresses the continuing 
Christian identity of England, this is in spite of the consistent challenges to its superior 
status by other Christian denominations, as in Scotland, where the religious majority is 
Presbyterian, which led WRWKHFUHDWLRQRID&KXUFKRI6FRWODQG  ,QGHHG µWKHIDLOXUHRI
the established Church to represent sections of the population dates back to the middle of 
WKH VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\¶ 7ULJJ   WKXV LQ (QJODQG DQG :DOHV 3URWHVWDQW
nonconformists have been vocal.  Further, Wilson (1966: 99) maintains that, 
µNonconformity was a challenge to the idea of social consensus implicit in the existence 
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of an Established Church which assumed itself to be the religious expression of the 
nation¶. 
The cycles of 19th century migration from Ireland to London, Glasgow, and the 
north of England considerably expanded the Roman Catholic presence in Britain. The 
turn of the 20th century, meanwhile, witnessed the arrival of destitute Jewish migrants 
fleeing both pogroms and economic deprivation in Russia. Both groups have been subject 
to processes of racialization and civil discrimination on the basis of their religious 
affiliation, but in due course have come to enjoy some of the benefits initially associated 
ZLWK µ(VWDEOLVKPHQW¶ 7KLV LQFOXGHV DOORZLQJ WKH &DWKROLF &KXUFK WR VHW XS VFKRROV
alongside the state and then, in the 1944 Education Act, to opt into the state sector and 
receive similar provisions to those enjoyed by the established Church; a provision which 
was soon extended to other religious groups, notably Jewish minorities (around half of 
whom are educated in state funded denominational schools).   
:KDW WKLV VKRZV LV WKDW %ULWDLQ LV QRW WKH FDVH RI µOLPLWHG SOXUDOLVP¶ &DVDQRYD
understands it to be, insofar as immigrant religions do not necessarily face greater 
obstacles in British modes of religious pluralism than in the US.  Trigg elucidates the 
question they do HQFRXQWHUµLIZHVD\WKDWWKH&KXUFKRI(QJODQGLVVRPHKRZ
the repository of English identity, might that not suggest that those who are not Anglicans 
DUH VRPHKRZ OHVV WKDQ (QJOLVK"¶. 7ULJJ¶V answer is ambiguous, but concedes that the 
(VWDEOLVKHGFKXUFKµFDQDW WLPHVUHSUHVHQWDOO&KULVWLDQYRLFHV LQ WKHFRXQWU\DQGHYHQ
ensure that other faiths can receive prRSHUSXEOLFUHFRJQLWLRQ¶7ULJJSRLQWVparticularly 
to the House of /RUGV6HOHFW&RPPLWWHH¶V LQVLVWHQFHWKDWµWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH8QLWHG
Kingdom is rooted in faith ± specifically WKH&KULVWLDQIDLWK¶TXRWHGLQ7ULJJ
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We concur with 7ULJJ¶V UHFRJQLWLRQ RI the deep historical role of Britain as an 
Established country, though one which has also GHYHORSHG D µPRGHUDWH VHFXODULVP¶
(Modood, 2010a) that is able to accommodate non-Christian faiths without 
disestablishment by selectively pluralising the church-state link through constitutional 
reform, public policies and social services delLYHU\  7KLV UHIOHFWV µKRZ HVWDEOLVKHG RU
institutionalised patterns, like principles and rights (of religious freedoms, for example) 
have been and have to be continuously re-interpreted and re-framed, and framing depends 
on competing discourses of incorporation, on discourse coalitions and power relations, 
DQGRQFUXFLDOHYHQWV¶%DGHU 
Symbolically, this prospect is illustrated in recent years in the moderately 
controversial statement from Prince Charles (Prince of Wales and heir to the throne) that 
as the next figurehead of the Established Church he could be the Defender of Faith rather 
than Defender of The Faith.  Much more controversially, Dr Rowan Williams ± the 
former Archbishop of Canterbury ± publicly considered what degree of accommodation 
the law of the land can and should give to minority communities with their own strongly 
developed legal and moral codes (Modood 2010b). He spoke particularly of %ULWDLQ¶V
experience with Islamic sharia courts and their capacity to rule on such matters as family 
disputes and claims.  For the purposes of forging a coherent nationhood that is inclusive 
RIPRUHWKDQDPDMRULW\UHOLJLRQWKHUHIRUHERWKRIWKHVHPRYHVLQYLWHDµVKLIWLQWKHVHOI-
recognition of a dominant constituency [which] works best if it acknowledges the shifting 
and historically contingent character of, say, the sensualities, language, faith, and 
canonical texts that have inspired it the most¶&RQQROO\. 
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Britain has faced its own challenges in addressing social disadvantages tied to 
cultural differences as experienced by a variety of ethnic and religious minorities.  The 
most substantive response developed cumulatively during the final quarter of the last 
century and comprised a range of policies and discourses commonly known as 
µmulticulturalism¶. Multiculturalist efforts strive for equality of access and 
accommodation of aspects of minority difference, while also promoting the social and 
moral benefits of ethnic minority-related diversity in an inclusive sense of civic 
belonging (Meer, 2015).  Indeed, at a public policy level Britain rejected  
operationalizing integration as a drive for unity through an uncompromising cultural 
µDVVLPLODWLRQ¶RYHU\HDUVDJRZKHQ then-Labour home secretary Roy Jenkins (1966) 
GHILQHG LQWHJUDWLRQ DV µQRW D IODWWHQLQJ SURFHVV RI DVVLPLODWLRQ EXW HTXDO RSSRUWXQLW\
DFFRPSDQLHGE\FXOWXUDOGLYHUVLW\LQDQDWPRVSKHUHRIPXWXDOWROHUDQFH¶ This has been a 
neither linear nor stable development, however, and has frequently been criticized not 
only by a variety of camps who ± for different reasons ± militantly opposed it, but also by 
WKRVH ZKR µDFFHSW>HG@ PXOWLFXOWXUDO GULIW JUXGJLQJO\ DV D IDFW of life, regretting the 
passing of the good old days when, they believe, Britain was a much more unified, 
SUHGLFWDEOHVRUWRISODFH¶Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 14). 
 
II-Configurations of Muslims and the state  
An examination of issues characterizing specifically Muslim integration and 
accommodation in the US and UK is now appropriate given that many of the historical 
multi-faith settlements were achieved with non-Muslims in mind, and some have argued 
that Muslims present a unique challenge to religious pluralism.  According to Joppke 
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(2009: 108) µif one considers that explicit Muslim claims did not emerge in earnest before 
1989, the year of the Rushdie controversy in Britain« the speed and depth of 
accommodating Muslims [has] been breathtaking¶.  Joppke (2009: 111) explains this by 
claiming that µLQSLRXV0XVOLPVWKHUHUHYHUEHUDWHVWKHDUFKDLFSRZHURIUHOLJLRQZKLFKLV
not merely subjective belief, but objective truth, which cannot leDYH URRP IRU FKRLFH¶. 
This quite narrow interpretation ignores how, ZKLOHµ0XVOLPVDUHUHOLJLRXVOy active, they 
lack the political power that well established churches have historically enjoyed, thereby 
WKUHDWHQLQJ WKHLU FDSDFLW\ WRZLQ VWDWH UHFRJQLWLRQ IRU WKHLU UHOLJLRXVQHHGV¶ 6RSHU DQG
Fetzer, 2010: 12).  The issues of claims-making and accommodation go to the heart of 
our discussion, though they vary across the US and UK contexts. 
Haddad and Lummis (1987: 3) were among the first WRLQVLVWWKDWµ7KHUHOLJLRQRI
Islam is now an American phenomena¶. Whether or not their optimism was premature, 
their description of the subsequent empirical state of affairs is undeniable.  According to 
6PLWKµ$PHULFDWRGD\LVKRPHWRWKHPRVWKHWHURJHQHRXV0XVOLPFRPPXQLW\
DW DQ\ WLPHRUSODFH LQ WKHKLVWRU\RI WKHZRUOG¶ Cainkar (2010: 177) details that: µ%\
2005 the number of Muslim Americans had reached an estimated 6-7 million, although 
the estimate is disputed, the majority of whom lived in medium to large-sized American 
cities and were born outside the US¶. There is some debate on the precision of these 
figures because the survey of religion in the national Census is prohibited, but the broad 
proportions are supported by a number of authors (see Ba-Yunus and Kone, 2004), and 
most estimations suggest Muslims now marginally outnumber Jews (Mazrui, 2004: 118). 
One striking and often overlooked feature of American Islam LVQRWRQO\WKDWµ,VODPLVWKH
second-ODUJHVWH[SUHVVLRQRI%ODFNUHOLJLRQLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶-DFNVRQEXW
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WKDWµDPRQJWKHJUHDW:HVWHUQGHPRFUDFLHV$PHULFD is unique in that the largest single 
JURXSRI LWV0XVOLPVFRQVLVWVRI LQGLJHQRXVFRQYHUWV¶  ,QGHHG µZKHUHDVSULRU WR
American Islam had been dominated by Black Americans, by early 1980s immigrants 
had moved into a position of political, economic, and intellectual doPLQDQFH¶-DFNVRQ
2004: 216).  Despite an earlier historical record, for a long time the Muslim presence in 
the US was synonymous with the modern African-American experience2, which perhaps 
commences with the 1913 founding RI 1REOH 'UHZ $OL¶V µ0RRULVK-American Science 
7HPSOH¶EHIRUH:')DUGFUHDWHGWKHµ1DWLRQRI,VODP¶12,LQDQGWKRURXJK
which the conversion of African-Americans, under the subsequent direction of Elijah 
Muhammad, became common.3  
As a result of both this historical presence and subsequent migration and post-
migration settlement, there are estimated to be over 1200 mosques, 300 Muslim 
organisations, 200 student groups, 200 Muslim Schools, 100 media groups, and 50 world 
social services and relief organisations. The most widely kQRZQDUHWKHODUJHVWµXPEUHOOD¶
groups of The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim American Society 
(MAS), the American Muslim Council (AMC), the Council of American-Muslim 
Relations (CAIR), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the American 
Muslim Alliance (AMA).  Grewal (2014: 128) understands these groups as forming part 
of the µGUDPDWLFUHVKXIIOLQJRI0XVOLP$PHULFDQUHOLJLRXVOHDGHUVKLS¶which she traces 
to three developments.  The first is the migration and reordering of American Muslims as 
majority-Sunni; the second is the configuration of professional and managerial classes 
that make up the American Muslim constituency; and finally the shift in racial dynamics 
IURP µ%ODFN 0XVOLPV¶ WR µ0XVOLPV¶ DV WKH 0XVOLP FRQVWLWXHQF\ ZDV EUoadened, 
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especially in the public mind.  At the same time, some of these organisations seek to 
follow paths established by earlier groups, often viewing Jewish minorities as a 
successful example (Mazrui, 2004: 119). Al-Alwani (2004: 7) details institutional 
progress in a number of key areas which build upon the concessions afforded to other 
groups. For example:  
 
In 1992, the Pentagon approved the appointment of religious instructors 
inside the three branches of the U.S. Armed Forces. The first minister, 
Chaplain Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad, was inaugurated in an official 
ceremony...  The number of mosques and Islamic institutions and schools 
markedly increased, and 1997 was designated the year of the introduction 
of Islam and Muslims to the United States. 
 
Equally important is to acknowledge that, unlike the experience of American 
Jews, Muslim American political activism is inevitably being defined by post- 9/11 
domestic and international struggles. This tendency is evident in the Council of American 
Islamic Relations¶ (CAIR) (2006) statement that, µUHJDUGOHVV RI the cause for a more 
politically conscious Muslim community, there are more politically active Muslims 
engaging in proactive discourse and professional activism than there was ten years ago¶.  
To this end the political scientist and public intellectual Muqtedar Khan (2004) 
RIWHQ WXUQV WR WKH $PHULFDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQ WR DVN µ:KDW LV LQ WKLV FRQVWLWXWLRQ WKDW DQ
,VODPLFVWDWHZRXOGQRWOLNHWRSURYLGHLW¶VSHRSOH"¶.  In so doing, the broader project he 
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seeks tR QDYLJDWH LV WKDW EHWZHHQ µ0XVOLP UHDOLVWV¶ DQG µ0XVOLP LGHDOLVWV¶ Muqtedar 
Khan, 2004: 103±104). The realists, he argues,  
 
are incensed with the United States for having an utter disregard for 
Muslim lives and Muslim society.  The media demonises Islam, everyone 
JHWV DZD\ ZLWK GHIDPDWLRQ RI 0XVOLPV« 0XVOLP UHDOLVWV DUH QRW
LPSUHVVHG ZLWK $PHULFD¶V GHPRFUDF\ RU LWV YDOXHV RI IUHHGRP DQG
pluralism. They point to the secret evidence act, used only against 
Muslims, which violates both these values by not allowing defendants full 
DFFHVVWRGXHSURFHVV«  
 
In contrast,  
 
Muslim idealists have not only transformed American Muslims from a 
marginal, inward-looking immigrant community to a reasonably well-
organised and well-FRRUGLQDWHG LQWHUHVW JURXS« 0XVOLP LGHDOLsts were 
quick to grasp the significance of the constitutional guarantee of religious 
freedom in the United States. (Muqtedar Khan, 2004: 105) 
 
+HFRQWLQXHV  µ7KH\DUHQRW$PHULFDQV ZKRDUH0XVOLPVRU0XVOLPVZKRKDYHEHHQ
born in the United States. They DUH $PHULFDQ 0XVOLPV¶  .KDQ LQVWHDG VHHNV WR
PRYH EH\RQG HLWKHU µRXWULJKW UHMHFWLRQ¶ RU µEOLQG LPLWDWLRQ¶ RI ERWK UHDGLQJV E\
HQFRXUDJLQJ$PHULFDQ0XVOLPVWRGHYHORSµILUVW-KDQG¶DFFRXQWVRIWKHLURZQ 
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.KDQ¶V invocation of the constitution was particularly pertinent in the dispute 
over the proposed building of The Cordoba Centre, an Islamic Center now named the 
Park 51 Project (widely referred to as the Ground Zero Mosque), two blocks from the site 
of the World Trade Centre buildings. The wider context for this controversy has been a 
securitisation of Muslim-state relations and increasing experiences of Islamophobia 
*RVK  µ,Q WKH IUDXJKW SRVW 6HSWHPEHU th SROLWLFDO FOLPDWH¶ DUJXHV *UHZDO
µWKHWULXPSKDOQDUUDWLYHVRID0XVOLP$merican Dream no longer ring out in 
Muslim American counter publics DVWKH\GLGLQWKHQLQHWLHV¶ 
Whilst Britain too has undoubtedly witnessed some securitization of ethnic 
relations, it is not quite the case, as one commentator has suggested, that state-Muslim 
relations amount WREHLQJµWRXJKRQPRVTXHV WRXJKRQWKHFDXVHVRIPRVTXHV¶)HNHWH
2004: 25).  Based upon data from the last decennial census (2011), between 2001 and 
2011 the Muslim population grew by almost 1.2m to 2.7m, increasing its share of the 
population from 3% to around 4.8% (Jivraj, 2013). This makes Islam the most populous 
faith in Britain after Christianity (59.3 percent); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 
1.5 percent numbering 816,633), Sikhism (0.8 percent equivalent to 423,158), and 
Judaism (0.5 percent numbering 263,346).  Muslims in Britain, as in the US and globally, 
are pre-dominantly Sunni, within which the two largest sects ± the Barelvis and 
Deobandis ± are of South Asian origins. Heterogeneity of ethnic, national and theological 
cleavages has led Ansari (2004: 3) to insist that:  
 
presumptions of Muslim homogeneity and coherence which claim to 
RYHUULGH WKHGLIIHUHQFHV«GRQRWQHFHVVDULO\ FRUUHVSRQG WR VRFLDO UHDOLW\
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A Sylheti from Bangladesh, apart from some tenets of faith, is likely to 
have little in common with a Mirpuri from Pakistan, let alone a Somali or 
Bosnian Muslim.   
 
While such readings guard against thinking of Muslims in Britain as a monolithic 
group, it is equally true that certain concerns transcend Muslim difference ± particularly 
since the (albeit slim) majority of British Muslims have not migrated to Britain but have 
been born here. Shared concerns are likely to encompass strategies to combat anti-
Muslim racism, or a desire amongst some Muslim parents to school their children in 
Islamic traditions, and so on. A national body was created to represent mainstream 
Muslim opinion and lobby on behalf of Muslims in the corridors of power.  With some 
encouragement from the main national political parties, the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB) was accepted as a consultee by the New Labour government of 1997 till about 
the middle of the next decade when it looked for new interlocutors. The MCB was very 
successful in relation to its founding agenda.  By 2001, it had achieved its aim of having 
Muslim issues recognised separately from issues of race and ethnicity, and of being itself 
accepted by government, media and civil society as the spokesperson for Muslims. 
Another two achieved aims were the state funding of Muslim schools on the same basis 
as Christian and Jewish schools, and in getting certain educational and employment 
policies targeting the severe disadvantages facing Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (who are 
nearly all Muslims) as opposed to targeting only minority ethnicity generally. 
Additionally, it played a decisive role in getting Tony Blair to go against ministerial and 
civil service advice and insert a religion question into the 2001 Census (Sherif , 2011).  
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This laid the groundwork for the possible introduction of policies targeting 
Muslims to match those targeting groups defined by race, ethnicity, or gender. Laws 
against religious discrimination were introduced in 2003 and strengthened in both 2007 
and 2010, making them much stronger than anything available in the rest of the European 
Union. Incitement to religious hatred, the legislation most closely connected to the 
protests over The Satanic Verses, was introduced in 2006, though there is no suggestion 
WKDW LW ZRXOG KDYH FDXJKW WKDW QRYHO ,QGHHG WKH SURWHVWRUV¶ RULJLQDO GHPDQG WKDW WKH
blasphemy law be extended to cover Islam has been made inapplicable as the blasphemy 
law was abolished in 2008 ± with very little protest from anybody. Moreover, even as the 
0&%EHFDXVHRILWVYLHZVRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VIRUHLJQDQGVHFXULW\SROLFLHVIHOORXWRI
favour, local and national consultations with Muslim groups have continued to grow and 
probably now exceed consultations with any Christian body and certainly any minority 
group. Inevitably, this has caused occasional friction between Christians and Muslims, 
but overall these developments have taken place not only with the support of the 
leadership of the Church of England, but largely in a spirit of interfaith respect. This 
respect is particularly striking when compared to the adversarial stance of some 
evangelical Christian Islamophobic discourses in the U.S.  
One further issue that has come to the fore is the provision of mortgages 
compliant with Islamic approaches to saving and investing, and the operation of 6KDU¶LD
law in civil matters more broadly.  For example, the Islamic teaching that riba (usury or 
interest) is haram (forbidden) is a guiding tenet for some observant Muslims, but is made 
implausible by systems of financial products which either generate or charge interest.  
One alternative system which has organically developed in Britain includes an 
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arrangement where banks buy property RQDFXVWRPHU¶s behalf, but then sell it back to the 
customer with an additional charge equivalent to the total amount of interest.  For some 
time, however, this incurred two sets of stamp duty (a tax which is payable to the 
government on the purchase of a house). In 2003, then-Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown abolished this double charge, and since then the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders and MCB have continued to liaise with various government departments on how 
to make Islamic home finance products more viable in the UK.4   
Further, since the 1970s some marital and inheritance disputes have been judged 
by Muslim arbitration boards if both parties have freely consented to such adjudication, 
and this has taken place under the broader remit of English civil law. Where the 
application of 6KDU¶LD has contravened English civil law it has been rejected by the 
courts, DV 3HDUO DQG 0HQVNL¶V  ±58) otherwise critical account of British 
traditions of positive law has detailed.  These kinds of developments illustrate the ways in 
whLFKµLW LV WKHRORJLFDOO\QDwYHDQGKLVWRULFDOO\PLVJXLGHGWRDVVXPH,VODPLVDQ\PRUH
inherently incapable of making peace with liberal democratic values than are Christian 
and Jewish traditions (Soper and Fetzer, 2010: 13).   
It is true that since 9/11, and especially since the London bombings of July 2007, 
Muslim communities have become objects of public suspicion and fear, and targets of 
extensive and often draconian surveillance and security measures, and 175 British 
Muslims have been convicted on terrorism-related charges (though not as many as the 
261 charged and not convicted, Home Office, 2013). Moreover, the media coverage in 
relation to Muslims and Islam often uses stigmatizing terms including fundamentalist, 
fanatic, and extremist (Moore et al., 2008), and nearly half of respondents in a survey 
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agree WKDWµWKHUHDUHWRRPDQ\0XVOLPV¶LQWKHFRXQWU\=LFNHWDO., 2011). Nevertheless, 
these dynamics have also inadvertently empowered some Muslim actors by bringing 
them into and funding them as civil society participants in certain spheres of governance 
2¶7RROH et al., 2015).  
In fact, despite the securitisation of the Muslim communities and openly 
expressed antipathy, Muslim self-identification as British and trust in public institutions 
is higher than it is among non-Muslims.  Heath and Roberts¶ (2008) analyses of the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V&LWL]HQVKLSVXUYH\ found µno evidence that Muslims or people of Pakistani 
heritage were in general less attached to Britain than were other religions or ethnic 
groups. EtKQLFPLQRULWLHVVKRZFOHDUHYLGHQFHRIµGXDO¶UDWKHUWKDQµH[FOXVLYH¶LGHQWLWLHV¶
(Heath and Roberts, 2008: 2).  These authors point instead to hyphenated identities, in 
VKRZLQJ WKDWRI0XVOLPVEHORQJ µYHU\ VWURQJO\¶ WR%ULWDLQ DQG say that they 
belong µIDLUO\VWURQJO\¶7DNHQWRJHWKHUWKHVHILJXUHVDUHKLJKHUIRU0XVOLPUHVSRQGHQWV
WKDQWKH\DUHIRU&KULVWLDQVRUWKRVHRIµQRUHOLJLRQ¶ (Heath and Roberts, 2008: 2). What 
is especially interesting is that this confident British Muslim identity has developed 
alongside pan-Muslim solidarities, including WKH LGHD RI WKH 0XVOLP µXPPDK¶ RU
µFRPPXQLW\RIEHOLHYHUV¶7KHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWV WKDWµ0XVOLPWUDQV-nationalism should 
not be treated as a post- or near- 9/11 phenomenon, but rather as a space and set of 
SUDFWLFHVWKDWKDYHHYROYHGRYHUGHFDGHV¶ (Mandaville, 2009: 497). This has proved quite 
consistent with the widely accepted body of findings, recently reiterated by Wind-Cowie 
DQG*UHRJRU\¶V(2011: 41) FRQFOXVLRQWKDWµRYHUDOO%ULWLVK0XVOLPVDUHPRUHlikely to be 
both patriotic and optimistic about Britain than are the white British community¶.  
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III-Conclusions: The implications for theories of religious pluralisms 
The implications of this analysis are significant for theories of religious pluralisms.  It is 
evident that there is a movement underway for synthesis between religious and national 
identities by Muslims themselves, and that this synthesis is facilitated by the rich public 
spheres and dynamic civil societies that have historically incorporated other religious 
minorities in both the US and UK. Further, the Established UK is no less successful at 
this than the US.  It is true that no effort has been made to disestablish the Church of 
England, and this has led many to argue that the constitutional status of the Church makes 
it more difficult for Muslims to achieve the kind of integration into the nation that their 
co-religionists are achieving in the United States. Kymlicka (2009: 548), for example, has 
DUJXHGWKDWµ$PHULFDQGHQRPLQDWLRQDOLVP«KDs been successful precisely in relation to 
«UHOLJLRXVJURXSVFRPSRVHGSULPDULO\RIUHFHQWLPPLJUDQWVDQG0XVOLPVLQSDUWLFXODU¶
ZKRDUHPRUHOLNHO\WKDQ(XURSHDQ0XVOLPVµWRH[SUHVVWKHIHHOLQJWKDWWKHLUUHOLJLRQDQG
religious freedoms are fully respected, and that they are aFFHSWHGDVFLWL]HQV¶. Similarly, it 
has been said of the US, in explicit contrast to certain European countries like Britain, 
WKDWµ>Z@LWKRXW WKHVHSDUDWLRQRIFKXUFKDQGVWDWHZHEHOLHYH WKHUHOLJLRQVLPSRUWHGE\
past immigration streams could not have achieved parity with Protestant versions of 
&KULVWLDQLW\¶)RQHUDQG$OED%KDUJDYD (2011) further argues that WKHµZHDN
HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶RUµPRGHUDWHVHFXODULVP¶RI%ULWDLQDOLHQDWHVWKe majority of Muslims.  
What problematizes this type of argument is that there is no evidence that 
Anglican Establishment actually alienates British Muslims. British Muslims include 
many vociferous political groups and between them they have proffered numerous 
critiques of socio-economic deprivation, religious discrimantion, incitement to religious 
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hatred, various foreign policies, anti-terrorist policies and so on. Yet, there is no record of 
any criticism by a Muslim group in relation to Establishment. However, many Muslims 
do complain that Britain is too unreligious and anti-religious, too hedonistic, consumerist, 
and materialist. The difficulty that Britain has with incorporating Muslims arguably has 
more to do with what Casanova identifies as the µUHFHQW WUHQGV WRZDUGV GUDVWLF
secularisatiRQ¶ &DVDQRYD   +HQFH, if the US is better at integrating post-
immigration religious minorities, this may be due not to non-establishment, but the 
greater presence and social status of religion and its closeness to the mainstream of 
society (a point recognized by Casanova, 2009 and by Foner and Alba, 2008). Indeed, 
while the US may be more of a secular state than Britain, the latter is more of a secular 
society and has a much more secularist political culture. As such, two quite different 
social compacts are at work: in the British case the µdeal¶ is that the religious majority 
can have state recognition at the highest level, but then it must exercise self-effacement in 
relation to the democratic process, if not public culture as well (Modood, 2009). In 
contrast, the µdeal¶ in the US is that if all churches can agree to allow a certain limited 
DUHDRISXEOLFOLIHDVµUHOLJLRXVO\QHXWUDO¶DQGµEH\RQGUHOLJLRQ¶WKHUHVWRISXEOLFOLIHLV
an open field for religion. In the US, all religious groups are free to lead the nation, to 
seek to make the nation in their own image ± as long as it is not through establishment. 
While both nations differ dramatically in the normative role religion plays in their 
political cultures, we argue that both can offer meaningful routes for not only political 
participation, but meaningful incorporation, to their respective Muslim minorities. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 7KLVLVLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHLQLWLDOIDWHRI&DWKROLFLVPZKLFKZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDWKUHDWEHFDXVHµLW
was viewed as a un-American-religion, insofar as Republicanism and Romanism were defined as 
EHLQJLQFRPSDWLEOH¶&DVDQRva 2009: 157).   
 
2 There is an important genealogy of a much longer presence of Islam in the Americas.  For 
example, Levtzion and Hopkins (2000: 169) point to evidence of pre-Columbian voyages by 
Mansa Musa of Mali. Elsewhere Bukhari, Nyang, Ahmad and Esposito (2004: xvii) recount the 
story of the Arab scholar Al-Idrissi whose works were allegedly carried by Columbus on his 
voyage.   
 
3 The NOI departs from orthodox Islamic traditions in two respects.  Firstly, and while believing 
that the Prophet Muhammad was the final prophet, it upholds the view that Elijah Muhammad 
was a further messenger.  Secondly, the NOI emphasises skin colour in a manner that departs 
from conventional Islamic teaching.   
 
4  See MCB press release 9 April, 2003.  
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Al-Alwani TJ (2004) Toward a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Reflections. In: 
Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M and Esposito JL (eds) 0XVOLPV¶3ODFH 
in the American Public Square. New York: Altamera Press, pp: 3-37. 
 
 
$QVDUL+µ7KH,QILGHO:LWKLQ¶0XVOLPVLQ%Uitain since 1800. London: Hurst. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ba-Yunus I and Kone K (2004) Muslim Americans: A Demographic Report. In: 
Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M and Esposito JL (eds) 0XVOLPV¶3ODFH 
in the American Public Square. New York: Altamera Press, 299-322. 
 
Bader V (2007) The Governance of Islam in Europe: The Perils of Modelling. Journal  
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33(6): 871±886. 
 
Barker E (1948) National Cultures and the Factors in its Construction. London:  
Methuen & Co.  
 
Bellah RN (1967) Civil Religion in America. Journal of the American Academy of  
 23 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arts and Sciences 96(1): 1±21. 
 
Bhargava R (2011) Beyond Moderate Secularism. The Immanent Frame. Available at: 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-moderate-secularism/ View 23 June 
2015 
 
Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M et al. (2004) Hope, Fears, and Aspirations: Muslims in  
the American Public Sphere. In: Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M and Esposito JL 
(eds) 0XVOLPV¶3ODFHLQWKH$Perican Public Square. New York: Altamera Press, 
126-158 
 
Cainkar L (2010) American Muslims at the dawn of the 21st century. In: Cesari J  
 (ed.) Muslims in the West after 9/11. New York: Routledge. 
 
Cassanova, J (2009) Immigration and new religious pluralism: a European Union- 
United States comparison. In: Levey G and Modood T (eds) Secularism,  
Religion and Multicultural Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Colley L (1992) Britons. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) (2006) What is the American Muslim  
&RPPXQLW\¶V5ROH" 
 
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB) (2000) The Future of Multi- 
Ethnic Britain. London: Profile Books. 
 
Connolly WE (1996) Pluralism, multiculturalism and the nation-state: rethinking the  
Connections. Journal of Political Ideologies 1 (1): 53±73. 
 
Fekete L (2004) Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State. Race and  
Class 46(1): 4±29. 
 
Fetzer JS and Soper JC (2005) Muslims and the State in Britain, France and  
Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Foner N and Alba R (2008) Immigrant religion in the US and western Europe: Bridge  
or barrier to inclusion?. International Migration Review 42 (2): 360±392. 
 
Grewal Z (2014) Islam is a Foreign Country: American Muslims and the Global Crisis  
of Autrhority. NYC: New York University Press. 
 
*RVK%µ,VODPRSKRELD'RHV$PHULFD+DYHD0XVOLP3UREOHP"¶Time 
Magazine, 30 August, 2010: 
 24 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2011936,00.html Viewed 23 June 
2015 
 
Herberg W (1955) Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious  
Sociology. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
 
Haddad Y and Lummis AT (1987) Islamic Values in the United States: A  
Comparative Study. New York: OUP. 
 
Heath A and Roberts J (2008) British Identity, Its Sources and Possible Implications  
for Civic Attitudes and Behaviour5HVHDUFKUHSRUWIRU/RUG*ROGVPLWK¶V 
Citizenship Review.  
 
Home Office (2013) Terrorism arrests ± analysis of charging and sentencing outcomes  
by religion, London. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/terrorism-arrests-analysis-of-
charging-and-sentencing-outcomes-by-religion/ (Viewed 23 June 2015) 
 
 
Jackson S (2005) Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection  
New York: OUP.  
 
Jackson S (2004) Preliminary Reflections on Islam and Black Religion. In: 
Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M and Esposito JL (eds) 0XVOLPV¶3ODFH 
in the American Public Square. New York: Altamera Press, 201-221 
 
Jenkins R (1966) Address given by the Home Secretary to a meeting of Voluntary  
Liaison Committees. 23 May 1966. London: NCCI. 
  
Jivraj S (2013) Muslims in England and Wales: Evidence from the 2011 Census. In:  
Alexander C, Redclift V and Hussain A (eds) The New Muslims. London:  
Runneymede Trust, 16-19. 
 
Joppke C (2009) Veil: Mirror of Identity. Cornwall: Polity. 
 
Khan AM (2004) Living on Borderlines: Islam beyond the Clash and Dialogue of  
Civilisations. In: Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M and Esposito JL (eds) 0XVOLPV¶
Place in the American Public Square. New York: Altamera Press, 84-113. 
 
 
 
Kymlicka W (2009) Review Symposium: Historic settlements and new challenges:  
Veit Bader, Secularism or Democracy?. Ethnicities 9(December): 546±552.  
 
 25 
                                                                                                                                                 
Levey G (2009) Secularism and religion in a multicultural age. In: Levey G and  
Modood T (2009) (eds) Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship.  
Cambridge University Press, 216-242. 
 
Levtzion N and Hopkins JEP (2000) (eds) Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West  
African History. Princeton: Weiner. 
 
Longley C (2002) Chosen People: Anglo-American Myth and Reality. London: Hodder  
& Stoughton. 
 
Mandaville P (2009) Muslim transnational identity and state responses in Europe and  
the UK after 9/11. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(3): 491-506 
 
Mazrui AA (2004) Muslims between the Jewish Example and the Black Experience:  
American Policy Implications. In: Bukhari Z, Nyang SS, Ahmad M and Esposito 
JL (eds) 0XVOLPV¶3ODFHLQWKH$PHULFDQ3XEOLF6TXDUH. New York: Altamera 
Press, 117-153 
 
Meer, N. (2015) Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
 
 
Modood T (2009) Introduction: Old Ways of Being Secular. Social Research 76(4): 
1169±1172. 
 
 
Modood T (2010a) Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for  
Religion. Political Quarterly 81( 1): 4±14. 
 
0RGRRG7E0XOWLFXOWXUDO&LWL]HQVKLSDQGWKH6KDUL¶D&RQWURYHUV\LQ%ULWDLQ,Q 
 Adhar R and Aroney N (eds) 6KDUL¶DLQWKH:HVW. Oxford: Oxford University  
 Press, 33-42. 
 
Moore K, Mason P and Lewis J (2008) Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation  
 of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 200-2008. Cardiff: 
Cardiff .University,  
 
2¶7RROH70HHU1'H+DQDV'HWDOGoverning through  
 Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State±Muslim Engagement.  
 Sociology, DOI: 0038038514564437 
 
Pearl D, Menski W (1988) Muslim Family Law. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
 
 26 
                                                                                                                                                 
6KHULI-µ$&HQVXVFKURQLFOH± reflections on the campaign for a religion 
TXHVWLRQLQWKH&HQVXVIRU(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶ Journal of Beliefs and Values, 32 
(1), 1±18. 
 
 
Smith J (2010) Islam in America. In: Cesari J (ed.) Muslims in the West after 9/11.  
NewYork: Routledge. 
 
Soper JC and Fetzer JS (2010) The not so naked public sphere: Islam and the State  
in Western Europe. German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the  
Middle East 11(2): 6±14. 
 
Tocqueville A (1969) Democracy in America. New Yorker: Harper & Row.  
 
Trigg R (2007) Religion in Public Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Weber PJ (1988) Separation of church and state: a potent, dynamic idea in political  
Theory. In: Wuthnow R (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Politics and Religion.  
London: Routledge.  
 
Wilson B (1966) Religion in Secular Society. London: C.A. Watts & Co. 
  
Wind-Cowie M and Greogory T (2011) A Place for Pride. London: DEMOS 
 
Wuthnow R (2006) American Mythos. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Zick A, Kupper B and Hovermann A (2011) Intolerance, Prejudice and  
Discrimination: A European Report. Berlin: Friederich Ebert Stiftung. 
 
 
Author biographies 
 
 
Nasar MEER is a Reader in Comparative Social Policy and Citizenship, and Royal 
Society of Edinburgh Research Fellow (2014-2019) at Strathclyde University.  His 
publications include: Citizenship, Identity & the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of 
Muslim Consciousness (2015, Palgrave 2nd Edition); Interculturalism and 
Multiculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines (co-edited, 2016 EUP), Racialization and 
Religion (Edited, 2014 Routledge), Race and Ethnicity (2014, Sage), and European 
Multiculturalism(s): Religious, Cultural and Ethnic Challenges (co-edited, 2012 EUP). 
He is an elected member of the UK Social Policy Association Executive (SPA), and in 
2014 he ZDVHOHFWHGWRWKH5R\DO6RFLHW\RI(GLQEXUJK¶V<RXQJ$FDGHP\RI6FRWODQG 
His website is www.nasarmeer.com  
Address: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lord Hope Building, 141 St James 
Road, Glasgow G4 0LT, University of Strathclyde, UK 
 27 
                                                                                                                                                 
Email: nasar.meer@strath.ac.uk 
 
Tariq MODOOD is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy, the founding 
'LUHFWRU RI WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI %ULVWRO¶V Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and 
Citizenship, and the co-founding editor of Ethnicities. He was awarded a MBE for 
services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001 and was elected a member of the 
Academy of Social Sciences in 2004. He served on the Commission on the Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain, the National Equality Panel and currently is on the Commission on 
Religion and Belief in British Public Life. His latest books include Multiculturalism: A 
Civic Idea (2nd ed; 2013),; and as co-editor Religion in a Liberal State (2013) and 
Multiculturalism Rethought (2015). His website is www.tariqmodood.com  
Address: Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, SPAIS, University of Bristol, 
11 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 1TU, UK 
Email:t.modood@bristol.ac.uk 
 
 
